Welcome! I am an Assistant Professor in the NYU Department of Politics. I study representation, accountability, and public service provision in state and local governments in the U.S. My book project explores why some local governments hire lobbyists to represent them at the state and federal level and examines the financial implications of intergovernmental lobbying on municipal inequality. This research has received support from the National Science Foundation and the Stanford Institute for Research in the Social Sciences.
I received my Ph.D. in Political Science from Stanford in 2017, where I was an Affiliated Researcher at the Bill Lane Center for the American West and the Thomas D. Dee II Graduate Fellow for 2016-17. Before entering graduate school, I worked as a legal analyst in Los Angeles. I graduated Phi Beta Kappa from The University of Southern California in 2010 with a major in Political Science and a minor in Piano Performance.
When Cities Lobby: The Market for Representation in Multilevel Government
Abstract: In the U.S., governments are among the most active lobbying groups. Local governments frequently lobby their state capitols, and both state and local governments lobby the federal government. But despite how common this behavior is, we lack systematic evidence about the conditions under which local governments lobby and the effects of this behavior on public policy. I argue that intergovernmental lobbying allows local governments to purchase advocacy when their needs are not met through formal channels of representation. I then test various implications of this theory using original quantitative and qualitative evidence from dozens of sources, including newly compiled longitudinal data on municipal lobbying in all 50 states. I conclude that while lobbying can provide local officials with an alternative way to advocate for local interests in state government when they are unhappy with the efforts of their elected state representatives, the benefits of intergovernmental lobbying are not equally distributed. Instead, high-income municipalities are more likely to lobby and experience greater monetary returns when they do. These results suggest that one reason why states have been so ineffective at reducing local revenue inequality is because affluent cities are able to translate their economic advantage into political power through lobbying.
When Are Local Incumbents Held Accountable for Government Performance? Evidence from U.S. School Districts. 2017. Legislative Studies Quarterly 42(3).
Abstract: Do voters hold local officials accountable for government performance? Using over a decade of panel data on school district elections and academic achievement in California, I causally identify the effect of test score changes on school board incumbent re-election rates and show that incumbents are more likely to win re-election when test scores improve in their districts--but only in presidential election years. This effect disappears in midterm and off-years, indicating that election timing might play an important role in facilitating local government accountability.
(Replication code and data here)
Cities in the Statehouse: How Local Governments Use Lobbyists to Secure State Funding. In Press, Journal of Politics.
Abstract: What happens when local governments hire lobbyists? Although intergovernmental lobbying is common in the U.S. and other federal systems, we know little about its consequences. Using newly compiled data on state-level lobbying across the country, I establish a positive association between city lobbying and state funding. I then introduce over a decade of panel data on municipal lobbying in California to estimate the returns to lobbying for cities with a difference-in-differences design. I show that lobbying increases state transfers to cities by around 8%. But the benefits of intergovernmental lobbying are not equally distributed. I find that cities with higher levels of own-source revenue per capita net more state money when they hire lobbyists, despite enjoying a local revenue advantage. These results offer some of the first empirical evidence that city officials can influence state spending by lobbying---but this behavior may also perpetuate local economic inequality.
(Replication code and data here)
Abstract: Why do local governments sometimes hire lobbyists to represent them in other levels of government? I argue that such mobilization efforts depend in part on the policy congruence between localities and their elected delegates in the legislature. I provide evidence consistent with this theory by examining how municipal governments in the U.S. respond to partisan and ideological mismatches with their state legislators---a common representational challenge. Using almost a decade of original panel data on municipal lobbying in all 50 states, I employ difference-in-differences and a regression discontinuity design to demonstrate that cities are significantly more likely to hire lobbyists when their districts elect non co-partisan state representatives. The results are broadly consistent with a model of intergovernmental mobilization in which local officials purchase advocacy to compensate for the preference gaps that sometimes emerge in multilevel government.
(Replication code and data here)
The Gender Gap in Political Careers: Evidence from U.S. State Legislatures. With Alexander Fouirnaies and Andrew B Hall. (Under Review)
Abstract: How do women’s legislative careers differ from men’s? Building on research documenting gendered career differences across many contexts, we introduce new data to study the political careers of more than 25,000 U.S. state legislators. Using a series of difference-in-differences designs to account for the types of districts that elect men or women legislators, we find that women are less likely to serve on top-flight committees, are less likely to chair these committees, and are less likely to serve in leadership. Women are also more likely to serve on women’s issues committees and to sponsor legislation on women’s issues. Follow-up analyses suggest that these differences in policy focus are driven by institutional factors rather than only differences in pre-existing policy interests or backgrounds. Furthermore, while we find no differences between men and women in their productivity as legislators, women raise considerably less money than men. The challenging landscape that women legislators face inside the legislature may help to explain the well-known fact that men are more likely to seek political office than women in the United States.
The Expressed Agenda of State Legislators. With Andreu Casas, Jonathan Nagler, and Joshua A. Tucker.
Abstract: Agenda setting is a topic of great interest to political scientists. To date, though, the vast majority of work in this area has focused on agenda setting at the national level. Sub-national units, such as US states, offer an untapped opportunity for advancing this field of research. In particular, states differ on a wide range of institutional, economic, and political dimensions, which facilitates testing hypotheses on the effects of these features on the agenda while keeping other national political factors constant. While previous research on agenda stating has eschewed state politics due to data limitations, we are now able to take advantage of the fact that most state legislators today use social media, and particularly Twitter, to discuss their issue preferences, making it easy to study the attention they pay to different policy issues across time. In this paper we use Twitter data and state-of-the-art topic modeling techniques to measure the expressed agenda of state legislators from fifteen U.S. states in 2018. We then use the data to address two questions that are crucial for our understanding of agenda setting and democratic politics more broadly; under what conditions do public representatives devote attention in their public communications to a) policy (rather than non-policy) issues, and b) particular policy issues.
Women's Representation in Local Government and the Municipal Employee Wage Gap
Mayors As Managers: Assessing Local Leadership in the U.S. With Maria Carreri.
Test scores and school boards: Why election timing matters. 2017. Brookings Brown Center Chalkboard, March 22.
You can view and download my CV here.